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1 Abstract
We provide recovery guarantees for compressible signals that have been corrupted with noise and
extend the framework introduced in [1] to defend neural networks against `0-norm, `2-norm, and
`∞-norm attacks. Our results are general as they can be applied to most unitary transforms used in
practice and hold for `0-norm, `2-norm, and `∞-norm bounded noise. In the case of `0-norm noise,
we prove recovery guarantees for Iterative Hard Thresholding (IHT) and Basis Pursuit (BP). For `2-
norm bounded noise, we provide recovery guarantees for BP and for the case of `∞-norm bounded
noise, we provide recovery guarantees for Dantzig Selector (DS). These guarantees theoretically
bolster the defense framework introduced in [1] for defending neural networks against adversarial
inputs. Finally, we experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of this defense framework against
an array of `0, `2 and `∞ norm attacks.
2 Introduction
Signal measurements are often corrupted due to measurement errors and can even be corrupted
due to adversarial noise injection. Supposing some structure on the measurement mechanism,
is it possible for us to retrieve the original signal from a corrupted measurement? Indeed, it is
generally possible to do so using the theory of Compressive Sensing [3] if certain constraints on
the measurement mechanism and the signal hold. In order to make the question more concrete,
let us consider the class of machine learning problems where the inputs are compressible (i.e.,
approximately sparse) in some domain. For instance, images and audio signals are known to
be compressible in their frequency domain and machine learning algorithms have been shown to
perform exceedingly well on classification tasks that take such signals as input [12, 24]. However,
it was found in [26] that neural networks can be easily forced into making incorrect predictions by
adding adversarial perturbations to their inputs; see also [25, 9, 20, 4]. Further, the adversarial
perturbations that led to incorrect predictions were shown to be very small (in either `0-norm,
`2-norm, or `∞-norm) and often imperceptible to human beings. For this class of machine learning
tasks, we show that it is possible to approximately recover original inputs from adversarial inputs
and defend the neural network.
In this paper, we first provide recovery guarantees for compressible signals that have been
corrupted by noise bounded in either `0-norm, `2-norm, or `∞-norm. Then we extend the framework
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introduced in [1] to defend neural networks against `0-norm, `2-norm and `∞-norm attacks. In
the case of `0-norm attacks on neural networks, the adversary can perturb a bounded number of
elements in the input but has no restriction on how much each element is perturbed in absolute
value. In the case of `2-norm attacks, the adversary can perturb as many elements as they choose as
long as the `2-norm of the perturbation vector is bounded. Finally, in the case `∞-norm attacks, the
adversary is only constrained by the amount of noise added to each pixel. Our recovery guarantees
cover all three cases and provide a partial theoretical explanation for the robustness of the defense
framework against adversarial inputs. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We provide recovery guarantees for IHT and BP when the noise budget is bounded in `0-norm.
2. We provide recovery guarantees for BP when the noise budget is bounded in the `2-norm.
3. We provide recovery guarantees for DS when the noise budget is bounded in the `∞-norm
and also introduce an additional constraint that improves reconstruction quality.
4. We extend the framework introduced in [1] to defend neural networks against `0-norm, `2-
norm and `∞-norm bounded attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the defense framework introduced in [1], which
we call Compressive Recovery Defense (CRD), in Section 3.1. We present our main theoretical
results (i.e. the recovery guarantees) in Section 3.2 and compare these results to related work in
Section 3.3. We establish the Restricted Isometry Property (RIP) in Section 4 provide the proofs
of our main results in Sections 5, 6, and 7. We show that CRD can be used to defend against
`0-norm, `2-norm, and `∞-norm bounded attacks in Section 8 and conclude the paper in Section 9.
Notation
Let x be a vector in CN and let S ⊆ {1, . . . , N} with S = {1, . . . , N} \ S. We denote by |S|, the
cardinality of S, i.e. card(S). The support of x, denoted by supp(x), is the set of indices of the
non-zero entries of x, that is, supp(x) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : xi 6= 0}. The `0-quasinorm of x, denoted
‖x‖0, is defined to be the number of non-zero entries of x, i.e. ‖x‖0 = card(supp(x)). We say
that x is k-sparse if ‖x‖0 ≤ k. We denote by xS either the sub-vector in CS consisting of the
entries indexed by S or the vector in CN that is formed by starting with x and setting the entries
indexed by S to zero. For example, if x = [4, 5,−9, 1] and S = {1, 3}, then xS is either [4,−9]
or [4, 0,−9, 0]. In the latter case, note xS = x − xS . It will always be clear from context, which
meaning is intended. If A ∈ Cm×N is a matrix, we denote by AS ∈ Cm×|S| the column sub-matrix
of A consisting of the columns indexed by S.
We use xh(k) to denote a k-sparse vector in CN consisting of the k largest (in absolute value)
entries of x with all other entries zero. For example, if x = [4, 5,−9, 1] then xh(2) = [0, 5,−9, 0].
Note that xh(k) may not be uniquely defined. In contexts where a unique meaning for xh(k) is
needed, we can choose xh(k) out of all possible candidates according to a predefined rule (such as
the lexicographic order). We also define xt(k) = x− xh(k).
Let x = [x1 x2]
T ∈ C2n with x1, x2 ∈ Cn, then x is called (k, t)-sparse if x1 is k-sparse and
x2 is t-sparse. We define xh(k,t) = [x1h(k) x2h(t) ]
T , which is a (k, t)-sparse vector in C2n. Again,
xh(k,t) may not be uniquely defined, but when a unique meaning for xh(k,t) is needed (such as in
Algorithm 1), we can choose xh(k,t) out of all possible candidates according to a predefined rule.
2
3 Main Results
In this section we outline the problem and the framework introduced in [1], state our main theorems,
and compare our results to related work.
3.1 Compressive Recovery Defense (CRD)
Consider an image classification problem where x ∈ Cn is the image vector (we can assume the
image is of size
√
n × √n for instance). Then, letting F ∈ Cn×n be the unitary Discrete Fourier
Transform (DFT) matrix, we get the Fourier coefficients of x as xˆ = Fx.
It is well known that natural images are approximately sparse in the frequency domain and
therefore we can assume that xˆ is k-sparse, that is ‖xˆ‖0 ≤ k. In our example of the image
classification problem, this means that our machine learning classifier can accept as input the
image reconstructed from xˆh(k), and still output the correct decision. That is, the machine learning
classifier can accept F ∗xˆh(k) as input and still output the correct decision. Now, suppose an
adversary perturbs the original image x with a noise vector e, such that we observe y = x + e.
Noting that y can also be written as y = F ∗xˆ+ e, we are interested in recovering an approximation
x# to xˆh(k), such that when we feed F
∗x# as input to the classifier, it can still output the correct
classification decision.
More generally, this basic framework can be used for adversarial inputs u = v + d, where v is
the original input and d is the added noise vector, as long as there exists a matrix A such that
u = Avˆ + d, where vˆ is approximately sparse and ‖d‖p ≤ η for some p, η ≥ 0. If we can recover an
approximation v# to vˆ with bounds on the recovery error, then we can use v# to reconstruct an
approximation Av# to v with controlled error.
This general framework was proposed by [1]. Moving forward, we refer to this general framework
as Compressive Recovery Defense (CRD) and utilize it to defend neural networks against `0, `2,
and `∞-norm attacks. As observed in [1], x[0] in Algorithm 1, can be initialized randomly to defend
against a reverse-engineering attack. In the case of Algorithm 2, the minimization problem can
be posed as a Second Order Cone Programming (SOCP) problem and it appears non-trivial to
create a reverse engineering attack that will retain the adversarial noise through the recovery and
reconstruction process. The same reasoning holds for Algorithm 3 which can be posed as a Linear
Programming (LP) problem.
3.2 Results
Theorem 1 (`0-norm IHT). Let A = [F I] ∈ Cn×2n, where F ∈ Cn×n is a unitary matrix with
|Fij |2 ≤ cn and I ∈ Cn×n is the identity matrix. Let y = Fxˆ+ e, where xˆ, e ∈ Cn, and e is t-sparse.
Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n be integer and let x[T+1] = IHT (y,A, k, t, T ) where x[T+1] = [xˆ[T+1] e[T+1]]T ∈ C2n
with xˆ[T+1], e[T+1] ∈ Cn.
Define ρ :=
√
27
√
ckt
n , τ(1− ρ) :=
√
3
√
1 + 2
√
ckt
n . If 0 < ρ < 1, then:
‖xˆ[T+1] − xˆh(k)‖2 ≤ ρ(T+1)
√
‖xˆh(k)‖22 + ‖e‖22 + τ‖xˆt(k)‖2 (1)
Moreover for any 0 <  < 1 and any T ≥
(
log(1/)+log(
√
‖xˆh(k)‖22+‖e‖22)
log(1/ρ)
)
, we get:
‖xˆ[T+1] − xˆh(k)‖2 ≤ τ‖xˆt(k)‖2 +  (2)
3
Now define ρ := 2
√
2
√
ckt
n , τ(1− ρ) := 2. If 0 < ρ < 1, then:
‖xˆ[T+1] − xˆh(k)‖2 ≤ ρ(T+1)‖xˆh(k)‖2 + τ(‖xˆt(k)‖2 + ‖e‖2) (3)
Moreover for any 0 <  < 1 and any T ≥
(
log(1/)+log(‖xˆh(k)‖2)
log(1/ρ)
)
, we get:
‖xˆ[T+1] − xˆh(k)‖2 ≤ τ(‖xˆt(k)‖2 + ‖e‖2) +  (4)
Note that for practical applications, (3) and (4) provide error bounds for larger values of k
and t than (1) and (2), at the expense of the extra error term ‖e‖2. Further, the above results
apply to unitary transformations such as the Fourier Transform, Cosine Transform, Sine Transform,
Hadamard Transform, and other wavelet transforms. Next, we consider the recovery error for `0-
norm bounded noise with BP instead of IHT. Providing bounds for BP is useful as there are cases
1 when BP provides recovery guarantees against a larger `0 noise budget than IHT. We note that
since Algorithm 2 is not adapted to the structure of the matrix A in the statement of Theorem 2,
one can expect the guarantees to be weaker.
Theorem 2 (`0-norm BP). Let A = [F I] ∈ Cn×2n, where F ∈ Cn×n is a unitary matrix with
|Fij |2 ≤ cn and I ∈ Cn×n is the identity matrix. Let y = Fxˆ + e, and let 1 ≤ k, t ≤ n be integers.
Define
δk,t =
√
ckt
n
, β =
√
max{k, t}c
n
, θ =
√
k + t
(1− δk,t)β, τ =
√
1 + δk,t
1− δk,t
If 0 < δk,t < 1 and 0 < θ < 1, then for a solution x
# = BP(y,A, ‖xˆt(k)‖2) of Algorithm 2, we
have the error bound
‖xˆ# − xˆh(k)‖2 ≤
(
2τ
√
k + t
1− θ
(
1 +
β
1− δk,t
)
+ 2τ
)
‖xˆt(k)‖2 (5)
where we write x# = [xˆ# e#]T ∈ C2n with xˆ#, e# ∈ Cn.
Our third result covers the case when the noise is bounded in `2-norm. Note that the result
covers all unitary matrices and removes the restriction on the magnitude of their elements.
Theorem 3 (`2-norm BP). Let F ∈ Cn×n be a unitary matrix and let y = Fxˆ+ e, where xˆ ∈ Cn
is k-sparse and e ∈ Cn. If ‖e‖2 ≤ η, then for a solution x# = BP(y, F, η) of Algorithm 2, we have
the error bound
‖x# − xˆ‖1 ≤ 4
√
kη (6)
‖x# − xˆ‖2 ≤ 6η (7)
Finally, we provide recovery guarantees when the noise is bounded in `∞-norm.
Theorem 4 (`∞-norm DS). Let F ∈ Cn×n be a unitary matrix and let y = Fxˆ+ e, where xˆ ∈ Cn
is k-sparse and e ∈ Cn. If ‖e‖∞ ≤ η1 and ‖F ∗e‖∞ ≤ η2, then for a solution x# = DS(y, F, η1, η2)
of Algorithm 3, we have the error bound
‖x# − xˆ‖1 ≤ 4kη2 (8)
‖x# − xˆ‖2 ≤ 6
√
kη2 (9)
1 As shown in Section 8.1.1 and Section 8.2.2
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3.3 Comparison to Related Work
The authors of [1] introduced the CRD framework which inspired this work. In fact, the main
theorem (Theorem 2.2) of [1] also provides an approximation error bound for recovery via IHT.
First, we note that the statement of the Theorem 2.2 in [1] is missing the required hypothesis
t = O(n/k). This hypothesis appears in Lemma 3.6 of [1], which is used to prove Theorem 2.2 of
[1], but it appears to have been accidentally dropped from the statement of Theorem 2.2 of [1].
By making the constants explicit, the proof of Lemma 3.6 of [1] gives the same restricted isometry
property that we do in Theorem 7. Therefore, the guarantees of (13) and (14) are essentially the
same as those in Theorem 2.2 in [1]. The main difference is that, to derive recovery guarantees for
IHT from the restricted isometry property, we utilize Theorem 8 below (which is a modified version
of Theorem 6.18 of [8]) while the authors of [1] utilize Theorem 3.4 in [1] (which is taken from [2]).
In addition, we also provide recovery error bounds for IHT in (3) and (4) of Theorem 1 that hold
for larger values of k and t at the expense of the additional error term ‖e‖2.
Other works that provide guarantees include [11] and [5] where the authors frame the prob-
lem as one of regularizing the Lipschitz constant of a network and provide a lower bound on the
norm of the perturbation required to change the classifier decision. The authors of [22] use robust
optimization to perturb the training data and provide a training procedure that updates param-
eters based on worst case perturbations. A similar approach to [22] is [28] in which the authors
use robust optimization to provide lower bounds on the norm of adversarial perturbations on the
training data. In [16], the authors use techniques from Differential Privacy [7] in order to augment
the training procedure of the classifier to improve robustness to adversarial inputs. Another ap-
proach using randomization is [17] in which the authors add i.i.d. Gaussian noise to the input and
provide guarantees of maintaining classifier predictions as long as the `2-norm of the attack vector
is bounded by a function that depends on the output of the classifier.
Most defenses against adversarial inputs do not come with theoretical guarantees. Instead, a
large body of research has focused on finding practical ways to improve robustness to adversarial
inputs by either augmenting the training data [9], using adversarial inputs from various networks
[27], or by reducing the dimensionality of the input [30]. For instance, [18] use robust optimization
to make the network robust to worst case adversarial perturbations on the training data. However,
the effectiveness of their approach is determined by the amount and quality of training data available
and its similarity to the distribution of the test data. An approach similar to ours but without
any theoretical guarantees is [21]. In this work, the authors use Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) to estimate the distribution of the training data and during inference, use a GAN to
reconstruct an input that is most similar to a given test input and is not adversarial.
4 Restricted Isometry Property
We now establish the restricted isometry property for certain structured matrices. First, we give
some definitions.
Definition 5. Let A be a matrix in Cm×N , let M ⊆ CN , and let δ ≥ 0. We say that A satisfies
the M -restricted isometry property (or M-RIP) with constant δ if
(1− δ)‖x‖22 ≤ ‖Ax‖22 ≤ (1 + δ)‖x‖22
for all x ∈M .
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Definition 6. We define Mk to be the set of all k-sparse vectors in CN and similarly define Mk,t
to be the set of (k, t)-sparse vectors in C2n. In other words, Mk,t is the following subset of C2n:
Mk,t =
{
x = [x1 x2]
T ∈ C2n : x1 ∈ Cn, x2 ∈ Cn, ‖x1‖0 ≤ k, ‖x2‖0 ≤ t
}
We define Sk,t to be the following collection of subsets of {1, . . . , 2n}:
Sk,t = {S1 ∪ S2 : S1 ⊆ {1, . . . , n} , S2 ⊆ {n+ 1, . . . , 2n} , card(S1) ≤ k, card(S2) ≤ t}
Note that Sk,t is the collection of supports of vectors in Mk,t.
Theorem 7. Let A = [F I] ∈ Cn×2n, where F ∈ Cn×n is a unitary matrix with |Fij |2 ≤ cn and
I ∈ Cn×n is the identity matrix. Then(
1−
√
ckt
n
)
‖x‖22 ≤ ‖Ax‖22 ≤
(
1 +
√
ckt
n
)
‖x‖22 (10)
for all x ∈Mk,t. In other words, A satisfies the Mk,t-RIP property with constant
√
ckt
n
.
Proof. In this proof, if B denotes an matrix in Cn×n, then λ1(B), . . . , λn(B) denote the eigenvalues
of B ordered so that |λ1(B)| ≤ · · · ≤ |λn(B)|. It suffices to fix an S = S1∪S2 ∈ Sk,t and prove (10)
for all non-zero x ∈ CS .
Since A∗SAS is normal, there is an orthonormal basis of eigenvectors u1, . . . , uk+t for A
∗
SAS ,
where ui corresponds to the eigenvalue λi(A
∗
SAS). For any non-zero x ∈ CS , we have x =
∑k+t
i=1 ciui
for some ci ∈ C, so
‖Ax‖22
‖x‖22
=
〈A∗SASx, x〉
〈x, x〉 =
∑k+t
i=1 λi(A
∗
SAS)c
2
i∑k+t
i=1 c
2
i
. (11)
Thus it will suffice to prove that |λi(A∗SAS)− 1| ≤
√
ckt
n for all i. Moreover,
|λi(A∗SAS)− 1| = |λi(A∗SAS − I)| =
√
λi
(
(A∗SAS − I)∗(A∗SAS − I)
)
(12)
where the last equality holds because A∗SAS − I is normal. By combining (11) and (12), we see
that (10) will hold upon showing that the eigenvalues of (A∗SAS − I)∗(A∗SAS − I) are bounded by
ckt/n.
So far we have not used the structure of A, but now we must. Observe that (A∗SAS−I)∗(A∗SAS−
I) is a block diagonal matrix with two diagonal blocks of the form X∗X and XX∗. Therefore the
three matrices (A∗SAS − I)∗(A∗SAS − I), X∗X, and XX∗ have the same non-zero eigenvalues.
Moreover, X is simply the matrix FS1 with those rows not indexed by S2 deleted. The hypotheses
on F imply that the entries of X∗X satisfy |(X∗X)ij | ≤ ctn . So the Gershgorin disc theorem implies
that each eigenvalue λ of X∗X and (hence) of (A∗SAS − I)∗(A∗SAS − I) satisfies |λ| ≤ cktn .
5 Iterative Hard Thresholding
First we present Theorem 8 and then use it to prove Theorem 1.
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Algorithm 1 (k, t)-Iterative Hard Thresholding
Input: The observed vector y ∈ Cn, the measurement matrix A ∈ Cn×2n, and positive integers
k, t, T ∈ Z+
Output: x[T+1] ∈Mk,t
1: procedure IHT(y,A, k, t, T )
2: x[0] ← 0
3: for i ∈ [0, . . . , T ] do
4: z[i+1] ← x[i] +A∗(y −Ax[i])
5: x[i+1] = (z[i+1])h(k,t)
6: return x[T+1]
Theorem 8. Let A ∈ Cn×2n be a matrix. Let 1 ≤ k, t ≤ n be positive integers and suppose δ3 is
a M3k,3t-RIP constant for A and that δ2 is a M2k,2t-RIP constant for A. Let x ∈ C2n, r ∈ Cn,
y = Ax + r, and S ∈ Sk,t. Letting x[T+1] = IHT (y,A, k, t, T ), if δ3 < 1/
√
3, then we have the
approximation error bound
‖x[T+1] − xS‖2 ≤ ρ(T+1)‖x[0] − xS‖2 + τ‖AxS + r‖2
where ρ :=
√
3δ3 < 1 and (1− ρ)τ =
√
3
√
1 + δ2 ≤ 2.18. Thus, the first term on the right goes
to 0 as T goes to ∞.
Theorem 8 is a modification of Theorem 6.18 of [8]. More specifically, Theorem 6.18 of [8]
considers M3k, M2k, and Sk in place of M3k,3t and M2k,2t and Sk,t and any dimension N in place
of 2n. The proofs are very similar, so we omit the proof of Theorem 8. We will now prove a lemma
that will be required for the proof of Theorem 1. For the proof of Lemma 9 and Theorem 1, we
use the following convention: let A ∈ Cm×N be a matrix, then, we denote by (A)S , the m×N
matrix that is obtained by starting with A and zeroing out the columns indexed by S. Note that
(A)S = A− (A)S .
Lemma 9. Let F ∈ Cn×n be a unitary matrix with |Fij |2 ≤ cn and let S ⊆ [n] be a index set with
|S| = t. Then for any k-sparse vector z ∈ Cn, we have:
‖(F ∗)SFz‖22 ≤
ktc
n
‖z‖22
Proof. First note that (F ∗)S ∈ Cn×n contains only t non-zero columns since |S| = t Therefore,
we have |((F ∗)SF )ij | ≤ tcn since |Fij |2 ≤ cn . Further, since the non-zero columns of (F ∗)S are
orthogonal to each other, we get ((F ∗)S)∗(F ∗)S = (I)S , where I ∈ Cn×n is the identity matrix.
Using this, we have for any w ∈ Cn,
‖(F ∗)SFw‖22 = 〈(F ∗)SFw, (F ∗)SFw〉 = 〈((F ∗)SF )∗(F ∗)SFw,w〉 = 〈(F ∗)SFw,w〉 = | 〈(F ∗)SFw,w〉 |
Now let V ⊆ [n] be any index set with cardinality k, that is |V | = k and let z ∈ Cn be any
7
vector supported on V . We then get,
‖(F ∗)SFz‖22 = |〈(F ∗)SFz, z〉| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈V
z∗k
∑
j∈V
((F ∗)SF )kjzj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
k∈V
|z∗k|
∑
j∈V
|((F ∗)SF )kj ||zj |

≤
∑
k∈V
|z∗k|
 tc
n
∑
j∈V
|zj |

=
tc
n
‖z‖21 ≤
ktc
n
‖z‖22
where we use the fact that z is k-sparse for the last inequality.
Now we provide the proof for Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Theorem 7 implies that the statement of Theorem 8 holds with
δ3 =
√
c·3k·3t
n and δ2 =
√
c·2k·2t
n . Noting that y = A[xˆh(k) e]
T +Fxˆt(k), where [xˆh(k) e]
T ∈Mk,t,
set x[T+1] = IHT (y,A, k, t, T ) and apply Theorem 8 with x = [xˆh(k) e]
T , r = Fxˆt(k), and S =
supp(x). Letting x[T+1] = [xˆ[T+1] e[T+1]]T , use the facts that ‖xˆ[T+1] − xˆh(k)‖2 ≤ ‖x[T+1] − xS‖2
and ‖Fxˆt(k)‖2 = ‖xˆt(k)‖2. That will give (1). Letting T =
(
log(1/)+log(
√
‖xˆh(k)‖22+‖e‖22)
log(1/ρ)
)
, gives
ρT
√
‖xˆh(k)‖22 + ‖e‖22 ≤ , which can be substituted in (1) to get (2). Noting that ||e[T ] − e||2 ≤
τ ||xˆt(k)||2 + , we can use the same reasoning as used in [1] to get:
‖xˆ[T+1] − xˆh(k)‖∞ ≤
√
2ct
n
(
τ‖xˆt(k)‖2 + 
)
(13)
‖xˆ[T+1] − xˆh(k)‖2 ≤
√
4ckt
n
(
τ‖xˆt(k)‖2 + 
)
(14)
which are the essentially the same as the results of Theorem 2.2 in [1].
Now we prove (3). Let z[T ] be as defined in Algorithm 1 with z[T ] = [z
[T ]
1 z
[T ]
2 ]
T ∈ C2n where
z
[T ]
1 , z
[T ]
2 ∈ Cn. Note that xˆ[T ] = (z[T ]1 )h(k). Therefore, we have z[T ]1 = F ∗(y − e[T−1]), where
e[T−1] = (y − Fxˆ[T−2])h(t). Now let S be the set of indices selected by the hard thresholding
operation h(t) to get e[T−1]. Then observe that z[T ]1 = F
∗(y − (y − Fxˆ[T−2])S). Next, note that
‖z[T ]1 − xˆ[T ]‖22 ≤ ‖z[T ]1 − xˆh(k)‖22 as xˆ[T ] is a best k-sparse approximation to z[T ]1 . We can thus write,
‖(z[T ]1 − xˆh(k))− (xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k))‖22 = ‖z[T ]1 − xˆh(k)‖22 − 2Re〈z[T ]1 − xˆh(k), xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k)〉+ ‖xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k)‖22
Therefore, we have,
‖xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k)‖22 ≤ 2Re〈z[T ]1 − xˆh(k), xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k)〉
≤ 2|〈z[T ]1 − xˆh(k), xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k)〉|
≤ 2‖z[T ]1 − xˆh(k)‖2‖xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k)‖2
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If ‖xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k)‖2 > 0, then ‖xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k)‖2 ≤ 2‖z[T ]1 − xˆh(k)‖2. Now note that,
z
[T ]
1 = xˆ+ F
∗e− F ∗(F (xˆ− xˆ[T−2]) + e)S
= xˆ+ F ∗e− (F ∗)S(F (xˆ− xˆ[T−2]) + e)
= xˆ+ (F ∗ − (F ∗)S)e− (F ∗)SF (xˆ− xˆ[T−2])
Using the fact that (F ∗)S = F
∗ − (F ∗)S , we can simplify the above to get:
‖z[T ]1 − xˆh(k)‖2 = ‖(F ∗)SFxˆt(k) + (F ∗)Se− (F ∗)SF (xˆh(k) − xˆ[T−2])‖2
Therefore,
‖xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k)‖2 ≤ 2
(
‖(F ∗)SF‖2→2‖xˆt(k)‖2 + ‖(F ∗)S‖2→2‖e‖2 + ‖(F ∗)SF (xˆh(k) − xˆ[T−2])‖2
)
≤ 2 (‖xˆt(k)‖2 + ‖e‖2)+ 2‖(F ∗)SF (xˆh(k) − xˆ[T−2])‖2
where we use ‖(F ∗)S‖2→2 ≤ ‖F ∗‖2→2 = 1. Now since xˆh(k) − xˆ[T−2] is 2k-sparse, we can use the
result of Lemma 9 to get:
‖xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k)‖2 ≤ 2
(‖xˆt(k)‖2 + ‖e‖2)+ 2
(√
2ktc
n
)
‖xˆ[T−2] − xˆh(k)‖2
Now let ρ = 2
√
2
√
ktc
n , τ(1 − ρ) = 2 and note that if ρ < 1, we can use induction on T to get
(3). Then for any 0 <  < 1 and any T ≥
(
log(1/)+log(‖xˆh(k)‖2)
log(1/ρ)
)
, we have ρT (‖xˆh(k)‖2) ≤  which
gives us (4).
6 Basis Pursuit
Next we introduce the Basis Pursuit algorithm and prove its recovery guarantees for `0-norm and
`2-norm noise. We begin by stating some definitions that will be required in the proofs of the main
theorems.
Algorithm 2 Basis Pursuit
Input: The observed vector y ∈ Cm, where y = Axˆ+ e, the measurement matrix A ∈ Cm×N , and
the norm of the error vector η such that ‖e‖2 ≤ η
Output: x# ∈ CN
1: procedure BP(y,A, η)
2: x# ← arg minz∈CN ‖z‖1 subject to‖Az − y‖2 ≤ η
3: return x#
Definition 10. The matrix A ∈ Cm×N satisfies the robust null space property with constants
0 < ρ < 1, τ > 0 and norm ‖ · ‖ if for every set S ⊆ [N ] with card(S) ≤ s and for every v ∈ CN we
have
‖vS‖1 ≤ ρ‖vS‖1 + τ‖Av‖
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Definition 11. The matrix A ∈ Cm×N satisfies the `q robust null space property of order s with
constants 0 < ρ < 1, τ > 0 and norm ‖ · ‖ if for every set S ⊆ [N ] with card(S) ≤ s and for every
v ∈ CN we have
‖vS‖q ≤ 1
s1−1/q
ρ‖vS‖1 + τ‖Av‖
Note that if q = 1 then this is simply the robust null space property.
The proof of Theorem 2 requires the following theorem (whose full proof is given in the [8]).
Theorem 12 (Theorem 4.33 in [8]). Let a1, . . . , aN be the columns of A ∈ Cm×N , let x ∈ CN with
s largest absolute entries supported on S, and let y = Ax + e with ‖e‖2 ≤ η. For δ, β, γ, θ, τ ≥ 0
with δ < 1, assume that:
‖A∗SAS − I‖2→2 ≤ δ, max
l∈S
‖A∗Sal‖2 ≤ β,
and that there exists a vector u = A∗h ∈ CN with h ∈ Cm such that
‖uS − sgn(xS)‖2 ≤ γ, ‖uS‖∞ ≤ θ, and ‖h‖2 ≤ τ
√
s.
If ρ := θ + βγ(1−δ) < 1, then a minimizer x
# of ‖z‖1 subject to ‖Az − y‖2 ≤ η satisfies:
‖x# − x‖2 ≤ 2
(1− ρ)
(
1 +
β
(1− δ)
)
‖xS‖1 +
(
2(µγ + τ
√
s)
1− ρ
(
1 +
β
1− δ
)
+ 2µ
)
η
where µ :=
√
1+δ
1−δ and sgn(x)i =

0, xi = 0
1, xi > 0
−1. xi < 0
.
Lemma 13. Let A ∈ Cn×2n, if ‖Ax‖22 ≤ (1 + δ)‖x‖22 for all x ∈ Mk,t, then, ‖A∗SAS − I‖2→2 ≤ δ,
for any S ∈ Sk,t.
Proof. Let S ∈ Sk,t be given. Then for any x ∈ CS , we have
‖ASx‖22 − ‖x‖22 ≤ δ‖x‖22
We can re-write this as : ‖ASx‖22 − ‖x‖22 = 〈ASx,ASx〉 − 〈x, x〉 = 〈(A∗SAS − I)x, x〉. Noting that
A∗SAS − I is Hermitian, we have:
‖A∗SAS − I‖2→2 = max
x∈CS\{0}
〈(A∗SAS − I)x, x〉
‖x‖22
≤ δ
Proof of Theorem 2. We will derive (5) by showing that the matrix A satisfies all the hypotheses
in Theorem 12 for every vector in Mk,t.
First note that by Theorem 7, A satisfies the Mk,t-RIP property with constant δk,t :=
√
ckt
n .
Therefore, by Lemma 13, for any S ∈ Sk,t, we have ‖A∗SAS−I‖2→2 ≤ δk,t. Since A∗SAS is a positive
semi-definite matrix, it has only non-negative eigenvalues that lie in the range [1 − δk,t, 1 + δk,t].
Since δk,t < 1 by assumption, A
∗
SAS is injective. Thus, we can set: h = AS(A
∗
SAS)
−1sgn(xS) and
get:
‖h‖2 = ‖AS(A∗SAS)−1sgn(xS)‖2 ≤ ‖AS‖2→2‖(A∗SAS)−1‖2→2‖sgn(xS)‖2 ≤ τ
√
k + t
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where τ =
√
1+δk,t
1−δk,t and we have used the following facts: since ‖A∗SAS − I‖2→2 ≤ δk,t < 1, we
get that ‖(A∗SAS)−1‖2→2 ≤ 11−δk,t and that the largest singular value of AS is less than
√
1 + δk,t.
Now let u = A∗h, then ‖uS − sgn(xS)‖2 = 0. Now we need to bound the value ‖uS‖∞. Denoting
row j of A∗
S
AS by the vector vj , we see that it has at most max{k, t} non-zero entries and that
|(vj)l|2 ≤ cn for l = 1, . . . , (k + t). Therefore, for any element (uS)j , we have:
|(uS)j | = |〈(A∗SAS)−1sgn(xS), (vj)∗〉| ≤ ‖(A∗SAS)−1‖2→2‖sgn(xS)‖2‖vj‖2 ≤
√
k + t
1− δk,t
√
max{k, t}c
n
Defining β :=
√
max{k,t}c
n and θ :=
√
k+t
1−δk,tβ, we get ‖uS‖∞ ≤ θ < 1 and also observe that
maxl∈S ‖A∗Sal‖2 ≤ β. Therefore, all the hypotheses of Theorem 12 have been satisfied. Note
that y = Fxˆ+ e = A[xˆh(k) e]
T +Fxˆt(k), Therefore, setting x
# = BP(y,A, ‖xˆt(k)‖2), we use the fact
‖Fxˆt(k)‖2 = ‖xˆt(k)‖2 combined with the bound in Theorem 12 to get (5):
‖xˆ# − xˆh(k)‖2 ≤
(
2τ
√
k + t
1− θ
(
1 +
β
1− δk,t
)
+ 2τ
)
‖xˆt(k)‖2
where we write x# = [xˆ# e#]T with xˆ#, e# ∈ Cn.
We now focus on proving Theorem 3. In order to do so, we will need some lemmas that will be
used in the main proof.
Lemma 14. If a matrix A ∈ Cm×N satisfies the `2 robust null space property for S ⊂ [N |, with
card(S) = s, then it satisfies the `1 robust null space property for S with constants 0 < ρ < 1, τ
′ :=
τ
√
s > 0.
Proof. For any v ∈ CN , ‖vS‖2 ≤ ρ√s‖vS¯‖1 + τ‖Av‖. Then, using the fact that ‖vS‖1 ≤
√
s‖vS‖2,
we get:‖vS‖1 ≤ ρ‖vS¯‖1 + τ
√
s‖Av‖.
Lemma 15 (Theorem 4.20 in [8]). If a matrix A ∈ Cm×N satisfies the `1 robust null space property
(with respect to ‖.‖) and for 0 < ρ < 1 and τ > 0 for S ⊂ [N |, then:
‖z − x‖1 ≤ 1 + ρ
1− ρ(‖z‖1 − ‖x‖1 + 2‖xS¯‖1) +
2τ
1− ρ‖A(z − x)‖
for all z, x ∈ CN .
Lemma 16 (Proposition 2.3 in [8]). For any p > q > 0 and x ∈ Cn,
inf
z∈Mk
‖x− z‖p ≤ 1
(k)
1
q
− 1
p
‖x‖q
Proof of Theorem 3. Let 0 < ρ < 1 be arbitrary. Since F is a unitary matrix, for any S ⊆ [n]
and v ∈ Cn, we have
‖vS‖2 ≤ ρ√
k
‖vS‖1 + τ‖v‖2 =
ρ√
k
‖vS‖1 + τ‖Fv‖2 (15)
where τ = 1. Therefore, F satisfies the `2 robust null space property for all S ⊆ [n] with card(S) ≤
k. Next, using Lemma 14 we get ‖vS‖1 ≤ ρ‖vS¯‖1 + τ
√
k‖Fv‖2 for all v ∈ Cn. Now let x# =
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BP(y, F, η), then we know ‖x#‖1 ≤ ‖x‖1, where x is k-sparse. Then letting S ⊆ [n] be the support
of x and using the fact that ‖xS‖2 = 0 and Lemma 15 , we get:
‖x# − x‖1 ≤ 1 + ρ
1− ρ(‖x
#‖1 − ‖x‖1 + 2‖xS¯‖1) +
2τ
√
k
1− ρ ‖F (x
# − x)‖2
≤ 2τ
√
k
1− ρ ‖F (x
# − x)‖2 ≤ 4τ
√
k
1− ρ ‖e‖2 ≤
4τ
√
k
1− ρ η
Letting ρ→ 0 and recalling that τ = 1 gives (6). Now let S be the support of the k largest entries
in x# − x. Note ‖(x# − x)S‖2 = infz∈Mk ‖(x# − x)− z‖2. Then, using Lemma 16 and (15), we see
that
‖x# − x‖2 ≤ ‖(x# − x)S‖2 + ‖(x# − x)S‖2
≤ 1√
k
‖(x# − x)‖1 + ρ√
k
‖(x# − x)S‖1 + τ‖F (x# − x)‖2
≤ 1 + ρ√
k
‖(x# − x)‖1 + 2τη ≤ 4τ(1 + ρ)
(1− ρ) η + 2τη =
(
4τ(1 + ρ)
(1− ρ) + 2τ
)
η
Recalling τ = 1 and letting ρ→ 0 gives the desired result.
7 Dantzig Selector
Next we introduce the Dantzig Selector algorithm with an additional constraint. We first prove its
recovery guarantees for `∞-norm and then explain the reasoning behind the additional constraint.
Algorithm 3 Modified Dantzig Selector
Input: The observed vector y ∈ Cm, where y = Axˆ+ e, the measurement matrix A ∈ Cm×N , and
constants η1, η2 such that ‖e‖∞ ≤ η1, ‖A∗e‖∞ ≤ η2
Output: x# ∈ CN
1: procedure DS(y,A, η1, η2)
2: x# ← arg minz∈CN ‖z‖1 subject to ‖A∗(y −Az)‖∞ ≤ η2, ‖Az − y‖∞ ≤ η1
3: return x#
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof follows the same structure as the proof of Theorem 3. Therefore
we provide a sketch and leave out the complete derivation. Let 0 < ρ < 1 be arbitrary. Since F is
a unitary matrix, for any S ⊆ [n] and v ∈ Cn, we have
‖vS‖2 ≤ ρ√
k
‖vS‖1 + ‖vS‖2 ≤
ρ√
k
‖vS‖1 +
√
k‖v‖∞ = ρ√
k
‖vS‖1 +
√
k‖F ∗Fv‖∞
The rest of the argument is the same as in the proof of Theorem 3.
7.1 Additional Constraint on DS
We now comment on the additional constraint ‖Az − y‖∞ ≤ η1 in the statement of Algorithm
3. Observe that the constraint is: |(Az)i − (Axˆ)i − ei| ≤ η1 for any i ∈ [n]. Since ‖e‖∞ ≤ η1,
the constraint implies |(Az)i − (Axˆ)i| ≤ 2η1. Now suppose that our input is an image x = F ∗xˆ,
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Layer Type Properties
1 Convolution 32 channels, 3× 3 Kernel, No padding
2 Convolution 64 channels, 3× 3 Kernel, No padding, Dropout with p = 0.5
3 Max-pooling 2× 2, Dropout with p = 0.5
4 Fully Connected 128 neurons, Dropout with p = 0.5
5 Fully Connected 10 neurons
Table 1: Network architecture used for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets in Section 8.2 and
Section 8.3. The first four layers use ReLU activations while the last layer uses a softmax activation.
Dataset tavg δ`∞ δ`2 ∆`∞ ∆`2
CIFAR-10 1.52 0.19 0.27 5.38 17.34
MNIST 1.47 0.14 0.19 3.46 9.99
Fashion-MNIST 1.50 0.10 0.14 2.87 8.27
Table 2: Recovery performance of Algorithm 1 on `0-norm bounded noise.
where F is the Discrete Fourier Transform matrix. Setting A = F ∗, the constraint ensures that
the entries of a reconstructed image F ∗z and the original image F ∗xˆ will be close. That is, the
constraint limits the feasible set of solutions to those that will lead to better reconstruction quality.
This is particularly useful when we need to utilize the reconstructed images for some downstream
task such as classification by a neural network. On the other hand suppose that we do not add this
constraint. Then, since ‖F ∗e‖∞ ≤
√
nη1 grows with the dimension of the ambient space, there is
no guarantee that the reconstruction will be close to the original image, especially when
√
nη1 is
large.
8 Experiments
We first analyze how our recovery guarantees perform in practice (Section 8.1) and then show that
CRD can be used to defend neural networks against `0-norm attacks (Section 8.2), `2-norm attacks
(Section 8.1.2) as well as `∞-norm attacks (Section 8.1.3).
All of our experiments are conducted on CIFAR-10 [13], MNIST [15], and Fashion-MNIST
[29] datasets with pixel values of each image normalized to lie in [0, 1]. For every experiment,
we use the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) and the Inverse Discrete Cosine Transform (IDCT)
denoted by the matrices F ∈ Rn×n and F T ∈ Rn×n respectively. That is, for an adversarial image
y ∈ R
√
n×√n, such that, y = x+ e, we let xˆ = Fx, and x = F T xˆ, where x, xˆ ∈ Rn and e ∈ Rn is the
noise vector. For an adversarial image y ∈ R
√
n×√n×c, that contains c channels, we perform recovery
on each channel independently by considering ym = xm + em, where xˆm = Fxm, xm = F
T xˆm for
m = 1, . . . , c. The value k denotes the number of largest (in absolute value) DCT co-efficients used
for reconstruction of each channel, and the value t denotes the `0 noise budget for each channel.
We now outline the neural network architectures used for experiments in Section 8.2 and 8.3. For
CIFAR-10, we use the network architecture of [10] while the network architecture for MNIST and
Fashion-MNIST datasets is provided in Table 1. We train our networks using the Adam optimizer
for CIFAR-10 and the AdaDelta optimizer for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. In both cases, we use
a cross-entropy loss function. We implement the following training procedure: for every training
image x, we first generate xˆh(k) = (Fx)h(k), and then reconstruct the image x
′ = F T xˆh(k). We then
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Dataset tavg δ`2 ∆`2
CIFAR-10 4.03 20.10 866.07
MNIST 4.01 5.08 381.33
Fashion-MNIST 4.02 6.84 298.73
Table 3: Recovery performance of Algorithm 2 for `0-norm bounded noise.
Dataset `2avg δ`1 δ`2 ∆`1 ∆`2
CIFAR-10 32.03 88.56 17.45 2015.47 315.22
MNIST 16.15 43.87 8.20 365.17 88.80
Fashion-MNIST 16.16 40.90 9.32 367.94 87.64
Table 4: Recovery performance of Algorithm 2 for `2-norm bounded noise.
use both x and x′ to train the network. For instance, in MNIST we get 60000 original training
images and 60000 reconstructed training images, for a total of 120000 training images. The code
to reproduce our experiments is available here: https://github.com/jasjeetIM/recovering_
compressible_signals.
Original
OPA
Figure 1: Adversarial images for CIFAR-10 created using OPA. The original images are shown in
the first row, and the adversarial images are shown in the second row.
8.1 Recovery Error
Since recovery guarantees have been proved theoretically, our aim is to examine how close the
recovery error is to the upper bound in practice. Each experiment is conducted on a subset of 500
data points sampled uniformly at random from the respective dataset. The first metric we report
is δ`p :=
1
500
∑500
i=1 ‖x#i − (xˆi)h(k)‖p, where x#i is the recovered vector for the noisy measurement
yi, (xˆi)h(k) = (Fxi)h(k) and the average is taken over the 500 points sampled from the dataset.
This measures the average magnitude of the recovery error for the respective algorithm in `p
norm. In order to relate this value to the upper bound on the recovery error, we also report
∆`p :=
1
500
∑500
i=1(Υi − ‖x#i − (xˆi)h(k)‖p), where Υi is the guaranteed upper bound for yi. Using δ`p
and ∆`p , we aim to capture how much smaller the recovery error is than the upper bound for these
datasets.
8.1.1 `0 noise
For each data point xi ∈ Rn, i = 1, 2, . . . , 500, we construct a noise vector ei ∈ Rn as follows: we
first sample an integer ti from a uniform distribution over the set {1, . . . , t}, where t is the allowed `0
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Dataset `∞avg δ`1 δ`2 ∆`1 ∆`2
CIFAR-10 0.99 10821.49 1435.45 4538.50 2207.48
MNIST 0.99 1519.27 213.23 2960.72 849.28
Fashion-MNIST 0.99 1824.30 274.21 2655.69 788.30
Table 5: Recovery performance of Algorithm 3 for `∞-norm bounded noise.
Orig. Acc. OPA. Acc IHT. Acc.
77.4% 0.0% 71.8%
Table 6: Effectiveness of CRD against OPA. The first column lists the accuracy of the network on
original images and the OPA Acc. columns shows the network’s accuracy on adversarial images.
The IHT. Acc. column shows the accuracy of the network on images reconstructed using Algorithm
1.
noise budget. Next, we select an index set Sti ⊂ [n] uniformly at random, such that card(Sti) = ti.
Then for each j ∈ Sti , we set (ei)j = cj , where cj is sampled from the uniform distribution on
[0, 1) and (ei)l = 0 for l /∈ Sti We then set yi = xi + ei as the observed noisy vector. We report
δ`∞ , δ`2 ,∆`∞ ,∆l2 and tavg :=
1
500
∑500
i=1 ti.
Recovery with Algorithm 1
We examine how (13) and (14) perform in practice. To do so, we set k = 4 for MNIST and
Fashion-MNIST and are allowed an `0 noise budget of t = 3. For CIFAR-10, we set k = 5 and are
allowed a noise budget of t = 3. We note that k values have been chosen to meet our computational
constraints. As such, any other values that fit the hypotheses of (13) and (14) would work just
as well. The results in Table 2 show that on average, the recovery error is well below the upper
bounds.
Recovery with Algorithm 2
We implement Algorithm 2 using the open source library CVXPY [6]. We set k = 8 for MNIST
and Fashion-MNIST and are allowed an `0 noise budget of t = 8. For CIFAR-10, we set k = 10
and are allowed a noise budget of t = 8. We observe the results in Table 3 and note once again
that the recovery error is well below the upper bound of (5).
Original
OPA-Rec.
Figure 2: Reconstruction quality of images using Algorithm 1. The first row shows the original
images while the second row shows reconstruction from the largest 275 DCT co-efficients recovered
using Algorithm 1.
15
8.1.2 `2 noise
Now we consider the case when the noise vector ei, i = 1, 2, . . . 500 is only bounded in `2-norm.
For each ei, i = 1, 2 . . . 500, we set (ei)j = cj , where cj is sampled from the uniform distribution on
[0, 1). Since there is no restriction on how small k needs to be, we set k = 75 for CIFAR-10 and
k = 40 for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. We report δ`1 , δ`2 ,∆`1 ,∆l2 and since the noise budget is
in `2-norm, we also report `2avg :=
∑500
i=1 ‖ei‖2. The results are shown in Table 4. As was the case
in the Section 8.1.1, the recovery error is well below the upper bounds of (6) and (7).
8.1.3 `∞ noise
We follow the same procedure as in Section 8.1.2 to construct noise vectors ei, i = 1, 2, . . . , 500.
This ensures that ‖e‖∞ ≤ 1. We also select the value of k as done in Section 8.1.2 as well. We
report δ`1 , δ`2 ,∆`1 ,∆l2 as well as `∞avg :=
∑500
i=1 ‖ei‖∞. Once again recovery error is well below the
upper bounds of (8) and (9) as shown in Table 5.
8.2 Defense against `0-norm attacks
This section is organized as follows: first we examine CRD against the One Pixel Attack (OPA)
[23] for CIFAR-10. We only test the attack on CIFAR-10 as it is most effective against natural
images and does not work well on MNIST or FASHION-MNIST. We note that this attack satisfies
the theoretical constraints for t provided (13) and (14), hence allowing us to test how well CRD
works within existing guarantees. Once we establish the effectiveness of CRD against OPA, we
then test it against two other `0-norm bounded attacks: Carlini and Wagner (CW) `0-norm attack
[4] and the Jacobian based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [20]. Each experiment is conducted on a
set of 1000 points sampled uniformly at random from the test set of the respective dataset.
8.2.1 One Pixel Attack
We first resize all CIFAR-10 images to 125 × 125 × 3 while maintaining aspect ratios to ensure
that the data falls under the hypotheses of (13) and (14) even for large values of k. The OPA
attack perturbs exactly one pixel of the image, leading to an `0 noise budget of t = 3 per image.
The `0 noise budget of t = 3 per image allows us to use k = 275 per channel. Table 6 shows that
OPA is very effective against natural images and forces the network to misclassify all previously
correctly classified inputs. Figure 1 shows that adversarial images created using OPA are visually
almost indistinguishable from the original images. We test the performance of CRD in two ways:
a) reconstruction quality b) network performance on reconstructed images.
Original
CW `0
JSMA
Figure 3: Adversarial images for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets for `0-norm bounded attacks.
The first row lists the original images, while the second row shows adversarial images created using
the CW `0-norm attack and the third row shows adversarial images created using the JSMA attack.
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In order to analyse the reconstruction quality of Algorithm 1, we do the following: for each
test image, we use OPA to perturb the image and then use Algorithm 1 to approximate its largest
(in absolute value) k = 275 DCT co-efficients. We then perform the IDCT on these recovered
co-efficients to generate reconstructed images. The reconstructed images from Algorithm 1 can be
seen in the second row of Figure 2.
Noting that Algorithm 1 leads to high quality reconstruction, we now test whether network
accuracy improves on these reconstructed images. To do so, we feed these reconstructed images as
input to the network and report its accuracy in Table 6. We note that network performance does
indeed improve as network accuracy goes from 0.0% to 71.8% using Algorithm 1. Therefore, we
conclude that CRD provides a substantial improvement in accuracy in against OPA.
8.2.2 CW-`0 Attack and JSMA
Having established the effectiveness of CRD against OPA, we move onto the CW `0-norm attack
and JSMA. We note that even when t is much larger than the hypotheses of Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2, we find that Algorithms 1 and 2 are still able to defend the network. We hypothesize
that this maybe related to the behavior of the RIP of a matrix for “most” 2 vectors as opposed to
the RIP for all vectors, and leave a more rigorous analysis for a follow up work.
To begin our analysis, we show adversarial images for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST created by
CW-`0 and JSMA in Figure 3. The first row contains the original test images while the second and
the third rows show the adversarial images. We show adversarial images for the CIFAR-10 dataset
in Figure 4.
Oroginal
CW-`0
JSMA
Figure 4: Adversarial images for the CIFAR-10 dataset showing `0-norm attacks. The first row
contains the original images, the second row shows images created using the CW `0-norm attack
and the third row shows images created using the JSMA attack.
Next, we follow the procedure described in Section 8.2.1 to analyze the quality of reconstructions
for Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, we show the reconstructions of
Algorithm 1 in Figure 5 and for Algorithm 2 in Figure 6. For CIFAR-10, we show the reconstructions
for Algorithm 1 in Figure 7 and for Algorithm 2 in Figure 8. In each case it can be seen that both
algorithms provide high quality reconstructions for values of t that are well outside the hypotheses
required by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. We report these t values and the improvement in network
performance on reconstructed adversarial images using CRD in Table 7.
2Recall that the results of Theorems 1 and 2 hold for all vectors in Cn, while for the vectors we considered
(CIFAR-10, MNIST, Fashion-MNIST), the recovery error in Section 8.1.1 was well below the guarantees.
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Original
CW `0 Rec.
JSMA Rec.
Figure 5: Reconstruction from adversarial images using Algorithm 1. The first row shows the
original images while the second and third rows show the reconstruction of the adversarial images
after recovering the largest 40 co-efficients using Algorithm 1.
Original
CW `0 Rec.
JSMA Rec.
Figure 6: Reconstruction quality of Algorithm 2. The first row shows the original images while
the second and third rows show the reconstruction of the adversarial images after recovering the
largest 40 co-efficients using Algorithm 2.
8.3 Defense against `2-norm attacks
In the case of `2-norm bounded attacks, we use the CW `2-norm attack [4] and the Deepfool attack
[19] as they have been shown to be the most powerful. We note that Theorem 3 does not impose
any restrictions on k or t and therefore the guarantees of equations (6) and (7) are applicable for
recovery in all experiments of this section. Figure 9 shows examples of each attack for the CIFAR-10
dataset while adversarial images for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST are presented in Figure 10.
The reconstruction quality for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST is shown in Figure 11 and for
CIFAR-10 we show the reconstruction quality in Figure 12. It can be noted that reconstruction
using Algorithm 2 is of high quality for all three datasets. In order to check whether this high quality
Original
CW `0 Rec.
JSMA Rec.
Figure 7: Reconstruction quality of Algorithm 1 for CIFAR-10. The first row shows the original im-
ages while the second and the third rows show reconstructions of the CW-`0 and JSMA adversarial
images after recovering the largest 500 co-efficients via Algorithm 1
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Figure 8: Reconstruction quality of Algorithm 2 on CIFAR-10. The first row shows the original im-
ages while the second and the third rows show reconstructions of the CW-`0 and JSMA adversarial
images after recovering all 1024 co-efficients using Algorithm 2.
Dataset Orig. C&W `0 JSMA
Acc. tavg Acc. IHT Acc. BP Acc. tavg Acc. IHT Acc. BP Acc.
CIFAR-10 84.9% 18 8.7% 83.0% 67.0% 34 2.7% 63.2% 67.3%
MNIST 98.8% 15 0.9% 84.2% 55.9% 17 56.5 % 90.1% 67.4%
F-MNIST 91.8% 16 5.27% 84.1% 71.4% 17 62.6 % 83.3% 72.0%
Table 7: Network performance on the original inputs, adversarial inputs and the inputs corrected
using CRD. Here the tavg column lists the average adversarial budget for each attack, Orig. Acc.
column lists the accuracy of the network on the original inputs, the Acc. columns shows the
accuracy on adversarial inputs, the IHT Acc. and the BP Acc. columns list the accuracy of the
network on inputs that have been corrected using Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 respectively.
reconstruction also leads to improved performance in network accuracy, we test each network on
reconstructed images using Algorithm 2. We report the results in Table 8 and note that Algorithm
2 provides a substantial improvement in network accuracy for each dataset and each attack method
used.
8.4 Defense against `∞-norm attacks
For `∞-norm bounded attacks, we use the BIM attack [14] as it is has been shown to be very
effective and also allows one to control the `∞-norm of the attack vector explicitly. We note that
while the CW `∞-norm attack [4] has the ability to create attack vectors with `∞-norm less than
or equal to BIM, it is computationally expensive and also does not allow one to pre-specify a value
for the `∞-norm of an attack vector. Therefore, we limit our experimental analysis to the BIM
attack. Note that for any attack vector e, ‖e‖2 ≤
√
n‖e‖∞ hence allowing `∞-norm attacks to
create attack vectors with large `2-norm. Therefore, we could expect reconstruction quality and
network accuracy to be lower when compared to `2-norm attacks. Figure 13 shows examples of
each attack for the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets while images for CIFAR-10 are presented
in Figure 14. We show reconstructions using Algorithm 3 in Figures 15 and 16. Finally, we report
the network performance on reconstructed inputs using Algorithm 3 in Table 9. We note that
Algorithm 3 provides an increase in network performance against reconstructed adversarial inputs.
However, the improvement in performance is not as substantial as it was against `0 or `2-norm
attacks.
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Figure 9: Adversarial images for the CIFAR-10 dataset showing `2-norm attacks. The first row
contains the original images, the second row shows images created using the CW `2-norm attack
and the third row shows images created using the DeepFool attack.
Dataset Orig. C&W `2 Deepfool
Acc. `2avg Acc. BP Acc. `2avg Acc. BP Acc.
CIFAR-10 84.9% 0.12 8.7% 72.3% 0.11 7.7% 71.6%
MNIST 99.17% 1.35 0.9% 92.4% 1.72 1.1 % 90.7%
Fashion-MNIST 90.3% 0.61 5.4% 78.3% 0.63 5.5 % 76.4%
Table 8: Accuracy of our network on the original inputs, adversarial inputs and the inputs corrected
using CRD. Here the `2avg column lists the average `2-norm of the attack vector, Acc. columns list
the accuracy of the network on the original and adversarial inputs, and the BP Acc. columns lists
the accuracy of the network on inputs reconstructed using Algorithm 2.
8.5 Which recovery algorithm to use for `0-norm attacks
As shown in Section 8.1.1, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 lead to high quality reconstructions for
`0-norm bounded attacks. Hence, it is conceivable that CRD using either algorithm should be able
to provide a good defense. However, we note that the `2-norm recovery error is lower for Algorithm
1 as seen in Section 8.1.1. Therefore, depending on the dataset, Algorithm 1 may lead to better
quality reconstructions and hence better network accuracy. From a practical perspective, one may
ask which algorithm is faster. Since Algorithm 2 is not technically an algorithm, its runtime is
dependent on the actual method used to solve the optimization problem. For instance, we use
Second Order Cone Programming (SOCP) from CVXPY [6] for solving the minimization problem
Original
CW `2
Deepfool
Figure 10: Adversarial images for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets for `2-norm bounded
attacks. The first row lists the original images for the MNIST and Fashion MNIST dataset. The
second row shows adversarial images created using the CW `2-norm attack and the third row shows
adversarial images created using the Deepfool attack.
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Dataset Orig. BIM
Acc. `∞avg Acc. DS Acc.
CIFAR-10 84.9% 0.015 7.4% 49.4%
MNIST 99.17% 0.15 4.9% 74.7%
Fashion-MNIST 90.3% 0.15 5.3% 57.5%
Table 9: Defense against `∞ attacks using CRD. Here `∞avg column lists the `∞-norm of each attack
vector, Acc. columns list the accuracy of the network on the original and adversarial inputs, and
the DS Acc. columns lists the accuracy of the network on inputs reconstructed using Algorithm 3.
Original
CW `2
Deepfool
Figure 11: Reconstruction from adversarial images using Algorithm 2. The first row shows the
original images while the second and the third rows show the reconstruction of the adversarial
images after recovering the largest 40 co-efficients using Algorithm 2.
in Algorithm 2. In our experiments, we noticed that the runtime of Algorithm 2 slows considerably
for larger values of n. However, Algorithm 1 does not face this issue (there is a slowdown but it
is much smaller than Algorithm 2). Therefore, if speed is important, it may be beneficial to use
Algorithm 1 as opposed to Algorithm 2.
Original
CW `2 Rec.
DF Rec.
Figure 12: Reconstruction quality of Algorithm 2. The first row shows the original images, the
second row shows reconstruction of CW-`2 and DeepFool images using 1024 co-efficients recovered
via Algorithm 2.
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Original
BIM
Figure 13: Adversarial images for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets for `∞-norm bounded
attacks. The first row lists the original images, while the second row shows adversarial images
created using the BIM attack.
Original
BIM
Figure 14: Adversarial images for the CIFAR-10 dataset showing the BIM attack. The first row
contains the original images, the second row shows images created using the BIM attack.
Original
BIM
Figure 15: Reconstruction from adversarial images using Algorithm 3. The first row shows the
original images while the second and the third rows show the reconstruction of the adversarial
images after recovering the largest 40 co-efficients using Algorithm 3.
Original
BIM Rec.
Figure 16: Reconstruction quality of Algorithm 3. The first row shows the original images, the
second row shows reconstruction of BIM images using 1024 co-efficients recovered via Algorithm 3.
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9 Conclusion
We provided recovery guarantees for corrupted signals in the case of `0-norm, `2-norm, and `∞-norm
bounded noise. We then experimentally verified these guarantees and showed that for the datasets
used, recovery error was considerably lower than the upper bounds of our theorems. We were able to
utilize these observations in CRD and improve the performance of neural networks substantially in
the case of `0-norm, `2-norm and `∞-norm bounded noise. While `0-norm attacks don’t necessarily
satisfy the constraints required by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we showed that CRD is still able to
provide a good defense for values of t much larger than allowed in the guarantees. The guarantees
of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 were applicable in all experiments and CRD was shown to improve
network performance for all attacks.
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